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In each stage of a repeated game with private monitoring, the players
receive payoﬀs and privately observe signals which depend on the play-
ers’ actions and the state of world. I show that, contrary to a widely
held belief, such games admit a recursive structure. More precisely, I con-
struct a representation of the original sequential problem as a sequence
of static games with incomplete information. This establishes the ground
for a characterization of strategies and, hence, of behavior in interactive-
decision settings where private information is present. Finally, the rep-
resentation is used to give a recursive characterization of the equilibrium
payoﬀ set, by means of a multi-player generalization of dynamic program-
ming.
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In each stage of a repeated game with imperfect private monitoring, the play-
ers receive payoﬀs and privately observe signals which depend on the players’
actions and the state of the world. This class of games has recently received
renewed attention from both an applied perspective and a more abstract one.
For example, in the context of oligopolistic markets a question naturally arises
about the possibility of collusion among competing firms which observe nei-
ther the prices nor the quantities of their opponents but only their own (Stigler
[20]). When this is the only available information and consumers’ demand is
stochastic, each firm may attribute a fall in its own sales either to a low level of
consumers’ demand or to an unobserved price cut by an opponent.
In the perfect information case, where each firm’s decision (a price in a
Bertrand competition, a quantity in a Cournot) is commonly observed, collusion
among firms can be (noncooperatively) enforced by each firm’s threat to revert
to a lower price or to a higher quantity if others do not act according to the
collusive plan. However, when firms’ decisions are not commonly observed, the
use of strategies of this form may lead to undesirable punishments. In fact, the
decision of a firm to revert, say, to a lower price can be based only on a low level
of observed sales. Since this may occur even when all other firms adhered to
the collusive plan, such a behavior would lead to a decrease in everyone’s profit,
and may even jeopardize any possibility of collusion at all.
In the case of homogeneous products — where the price of the good serves
as a publicly observed signal about the competitors’ quantities — the problem
has been successfully investigated by Green and Porter [10] and Abreu, Pearce
and Stacchetti [1], who have shown that collusive behavior may emerge as an
equilibrium, and have characterized such a behavior in terms of the commonly
observed price. Moreover, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin established that a
Perfect Folk-Theorem holds for this class of games (any feasible and individu-
ally rational payoﬀ can be obtained as an outcome of a perfect equilibrium as
the discount factor tends to one). Hence, for large discount factors, collusive be-
havior is neither less profitable nor less feasible than in the perfect information
case.
However, the question of whether collusion can be sustained has gone unan-
swered when no such public signal is available. Still, the presence of private
information seems to be a salient feature of many oligopolistic markets.
The same widespread presence of private information makes many other
economic environments suitable of analysis within the framework of games with
private monitoring. Examples range from various types of agency problems
to bargaining models to models with information lags about the opponents’
actions.
From a more theoretical point of view, the model of games with private mon-
itoring appears as the natural laboratory for jointly analyzing two of the main
problems economic theory has focused on during the last decades: the behavior
of individuals who interact each other and recognize that others’ decisions might
be based on information unavailable to them, and the behavior of individuals
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who are engaged in long-term relationships.
In spite of the economic interest in this class of problems, a general theory
has not yet appeared. Several papers (Bhaskar and van Damme [5], Compte
[6], Kandori and Matsushima [12], Matsushima [14], Sekiguchi [19]) have argued
that the main diﬃculty for the construction of such a theory relies in that, in
contrast to the public information case, games with private monitoring lack of
a recursive structure. By this is meant the possibility of representing a prob-
lem involving maximization over sequences as a sequence of static maximization
problems, the main advantage being in that it leads to a transparent characteri-
zation of the decision maker’s behavior (e.g., Stokey and Lucas [21], in a decision
theoretic framework; Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom[7], in a contracting
framework). In interactive-decision settings, the achievement of a recursive
structure — and, consequently, of appropriate generalizations of dynamic pro-
gramming — has led to comprehensive theories both in the perfect (Fudenberg
and Maskin [9]) and in the imperfect public information case (Abreu, Pearce
and Stacchetti [2]; Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [8]) as well as in the case of
stochastic games (Mertens and Parthasarathy [16]).
It is natural, then, to ask if such a structure is irretrievably lost when private
information is present.
The wide range of economic situations that naturally lend themselves to the
framework of games with private monitoring has motivated the importance of
understanding such a class of games. With this motivation in mind, the question
about the recursive structure is primarily a question about how to look at such
problems. For if a recursive structure were not achievable, that would mean that
we have to look for new concepts, since anything that is known for other classes
of repeated games comes from (or can be formulated in terms of) a recursive
structure. In fact — under the presumption that a recursive structure does not
exist — the literature devoted to the problem has mainly been confined either to
two-period games or to quite specific questions.
In this paper, a recursive structure for games with imperfect private monitor-
ing is provided. The representation that arises from this finding (the sequence
of static games above) leads, perhaps not surprisingly, to a close connection to
games of incomplete information,1 thus establishing the ground for a characteri-
zation of strategies and, hence, of behavior in interactive-decision settings where
private information is present. Finally, the representation is used to give a re-
cursive characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀ set, by means of a multi-player
extension of dynamic programming.
Related literature. In recent years, several papers have been devoted to re-
peated games with imperfect private monitoring. Absent a theory, the main goal
1This should not be surprising as Harsanyi ([11]) modeled games of incomplete information
as games with imperfect private monitoring. In his model, players receive private signals about
the move of the player “Nature”.
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has been to devise a series of examples that could cast light on the features distin-
guishing this class of games from the more understood ones. Within specific con-
texts, questions have been asked about particular classes of strategies(Compte
[6]), about the possibility of attaining eﬃciency (Ayoagi [4], Bhaskar and van
Damme [5], Sekiguchi [19]), about the role of communication when private infor-
mation is present (Kandori and Matsushima [12]) as well as about the classical
theme of repeated games that of “repetition leads to cooperation” (Matsushima
[14], Mailath and Morris [13]). All these papers, with the exception of [13],
have argued that a recursive structure does not exist (see section 3.2), and con-
sequently assert the impossibility of extending dynamic programming methods
to the analysis of these games.
In a diﬀerent vein, Mertens (Mertens [15]) suggested that a general model
of repeated games might display a recursive structure, by proposing a class of
“Entrance Laws”2 (a class of static games, in the terminology used above) for
the repeated game. He also gave a detailed analysis for the two-person zero-sum
case.
Summary of the Argument. In the present paper, the problem is approached
by introducing a family of sequences of approximating games, whose limits are
the original game. The properties of such a family lead, in a constructive way,
to a space of entrance laws for general n-person nonzero-sum repeated games
with imperfect private monitoring. Also, it is sketched how such a construction
can be extended to more general games. An implication of this procedure is a
recursive characterization of of the equilibrium payoﬀ set.
The argument developed in the paper can be briefly summarized as follows.
1. State variable: In a sequential decision problem, an obvious state variable is
the vector of signals the decision-maker has received up to the moment in which
he makes his decision. Similarly, an obvious state variable for a repeated game
is the I-tuple whose i-th component is player i’s vector of signals, and I is the
number of players. This is called a “state of the world”.
2. Strategic-form continuation games: A strategic-form continuation game (a
game with continuation payoﬀs) is associated to each state of the world.
3. Games with Incomplete Information: Given a state of the world, each player
has, generally speaking, only partial information about the true continuation
game.3 This information is summarized by a conditional probability distribution
over the set of possible continuation games. The set of all possible continuation
games at a given state of the world, along with such conditionals defines a game
of incomplete information.
4. Common Knowledge: It will be shown that (“at an equilibrium” of the
repeated game) this game of incomplete information is consistent, and by a
theorem of Mertens and Zamir ([17], Cor. 4.7 and Thm. 5.3) it is common
knowledge among the players.
2This terminology is due to Mertens [15].
3This is so because the true continuation game depends also on his opponents’ signals,
which are, generally speaking, unknown to him.
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5. Method of Successive Approximations: This construction is then used to
define sequences whose elements are finitely repeated games (called auxiliary
games) so that each sequence converges to the original repeated game. The
properties of these sequences are then investigated and used to construct an
appropriate space of entrance laws for the repeated game.
6. The Equilibrium Payoﬀ Set: From the procedure outlined so far it will follow
that the equilibrium payoﬀ set of the repeated game is the infinite intersection
of a family of equilibrium payoﬀ sets, each associated with an auxiliary game.
Section 2 describes the basic model of discounted repeated games with im-
perfect private monitoring. After a brief summary of the main results achieved
for the imperfect public information case and a discussion about the claim of
nonexistence of a recursive structure, section 3 introduces, rather informally,
some of the concepts the present analysis is built on. Section 4 contains the
main definitions and develops the approximating procedure. There, a represen-
tation of the space of entrance laws is given. Section 5 is devoted to the study
of the equilibrium payoﬀ set. Section 6 discusses some extensions, and Section
7 concludes.
2 The Model
In the stage game both the payoﬀs and the signals received by each player
depend on the realization of a random variable in a set Ω, which is called the
basic domain of uncertainty. An action profile in the stage game determines a
lottery over Ω; then, an element in Ω is selected by such a lottery, and both
payoﬀs and signals are assigned.
More precisely, the stage game G has the following features:
(i) A finite set of players I;
(ii) Finite action spaces Ai, for each player i ∈ I. An action profile is an element
a ∈ A = ×iAi ;
(iii) The basic domain of uncertainty is Ω ⊂ Rd (d <∞), and is assumed to be
compact. (Ω, BΩ) is a measurable space, with BΩ referring to the Borel sets of
Ω.
(iv) A profile a ∈ A induces a measure µ(a) on Ω. We assume that µ(a) is
absolutely continuous with respect to some measure µ on Rd, for any a ∈ A.
(v) When profile a is played and ω realized, player i gets a payoﬀ gi(ω, a). Such
a payoﬀ is nonnegative (WLOG) and bounded from above by some c ∈ R.
A mixed action mi for player i is a measure over Ai. The set of all mixed
actions for player i is denoted by ∆(Ai), and ∆(A) stands for ×i∆(Ai), whose
generic element is denoted by m. The measures µ(a)’s are extended to the Borel
field of ∆(A) in the obvious way, and gi(ω,m) defined correspondingly. When
profile m is played, player i’s expected payoﬀ is denoted by EΩ [gi(ω,m)].
In the repeated game G∞, each player maximizes the discounted sum of
his per-period payoﬀs; δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes their common discount factor. The
signalling structure in G∞ is specified as follows:
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(vi) For each player i, a (deterministic, for simplicity) signalling function θi :
Ω → Θi is defined by θi(ω) = θi ∈ Θi. Such functions are onto (WLOG), and
Θi is called the space of signals for player i.
To avoid technicalities, we assume for most of the paper that Θi is a finite
set, ∀i ∈ I. The main advantage for doing so is that the assumption guarantees
that the auxiliary games of Section 4 have a finite normal-form. Hence, we can
invoke Nash theorem to ensure existence of equilibria (see, however, Section ??
about removing this assumption).
(vii) The functions θi(·)’s are assumed to be common knowledge among the
players.
The realization ω which occurs at the end of stage t − 1 is denoted by ωt.
Thus, player i’s information at the stage t-th is given by θti = {θi,1, ..., θi,t} ∈
Θti = ×tΘi, where θi,t = θi(ωt). A strategy for player i in G∞ is {σti}∞t=0 ,
σti : Θti → ∆(Ai).
An object that will play a role in this paper is the signalling function
for the game. This is the function θ : Ω → Θ = ×i∈IΘi defined by θ(·) =
(θ1(·), ..., θI(·)). We make Θ into a measurable space so that θ(·) is measurable.
By P (· | m) we denote the pushforward θ∗µ(m) = µ(m) ◦ θ−1 of µ(m), and by
P t(· | ·) the product measure on Θt = ×i∈IΘti. Finally, we denote by P the
pushforward of µ, and by P t the corresponding product measure on Θt.
Note that, in order to ensure a high degree of flexibility, we have not specified
the nature of the spaces Ω and Θ that appear in the above description. Con-
sequently, several classes of games can be casted within the present framework
by means of a simple reformulation of the relevant variables. For example, in
the present study we are mainly interested in the type of problems described in
the introduction. In those settings, an important source of private information
comes from a players knowledge of his own actions. Clearly, such a knowledge
must be included in the space Θi of player i’s signals. Neverthless, sometimes
the problem already contains, among its data, spaces Ω and Θ, but player i’s
privately observed actions are not included in the Θi’s. In such a case, a way
to correctly reformulate the problem consists in defining new spaces Ω˜ = Ω×A
and Θ˜ = Θ×A, and in writing player i’s signalling function as θ˜i = (θi, a).
A general example of this model is a repeated game where, at the end of
each stage, players observe neither ω, nor the actions played, nor their own
payoﬀs, but only some imperfectly correlated signal in some space Θi. A case
of particular interest is that of observable payoﬀs: θi is the payoﬀ received by
player i after a stage is played, and this is the only information available to him.
An example of this specification is Stigler’s model of oligopoly described in the
introduction. Clearly, the model contains as special cases (a) the imperfect
public information case, identified by θi(ω) = ω,∀ω ∈ Ω,∀i ∈ I ; (b) the perfect
information case, where Ω = ∆(A) and θi(m) = m,∀i ∈ I.
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A simple example that captures many of the typical features of repeated
games with imperfect private monitoring is as follows. Let G be a 2× 2 normal
form game whose payoﬀs depend on the realization of a random variable ω ∈ Ω,
and assume that Ω = {(L,L), (L,H), (H,L), (H,H)}. After G is played and ω
is realized, player 1 is told the first component of ω, and player 2 the second.
Therefore, Θi = {L,H} , i = 1, 2, and after the signal is received, player i has a
nontrivial partition on Ω = Θ = Θ1 ×Θ2.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Repeated Games with Public Information
This section contains a quick, and by no means comprehensive, overview of the
results achieved in the public information case. The main purpose of this part
is instrumental: by discussing the public information case both some concepts
that will be later developed are introduced and it will be explained why it has
been suggested that a recursive structure might not be achievable in the private
monitoring case.
Repeated games with imperfect public information are characterized by the
specification θi(ω) = ω,∀i ∈ I (that is the realization ω is publicly observed;
section 2 above). This class of games has been extensively studied by Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti ([2]; hereafter APS) and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
([8]).
Since the purpose of this section is only expository, the reader may assume —
in order to avoid some qualifications — that ω is the only information available to
each player. In such a case, we do not need to distinguish between pure, mixed
and behavior strategies. Alternatively, the reader can think of the games in the
text as decision problems, and cast the explanation in the standard dynamic
programming framework.
In [2], it was shown that any equilibrium payoﬀ vector v ∈ V of the repeated
game, can be written as








where, σ0 is the time-0 component of an equilibrium profile σ that generates v,
and q = (q1, ..., qI) is a measurable function q : Ω→ V .
A flavor of logic underlying the proof may be obtained from the following
considerations. In this framework, after G is played, ω is realized and observed
by all players. We have, then, a subgame starting at such a realization of ω. A
strategy for player i maps ωt 7→ ∆(Ai). Under the assumption of full support
of µ ( [2]), every Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect in the subgames thus
defined. As a consequence, if σ is a Nash equilibrium of G∞, we immediately
obtain — as of time 0 — the above decomposition as soon as we assign to q(ω)
an equilibrium value for the subgame starting at ω.
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Now consider the restriction of the given equilibrium profile σ to the subgame
starting at ω. Since the initial state in G∞ is free, we can start by playing this
profile at time 0, and still get an equilibrium. That is, such a restriction is an
equilibrium profile of G∞ as well. Hence, q has range in V . In other words, q(ω)
is an equilibrium payoﬀ vector of G∞ as well, for any ω ∈ Ω. Combining this
fact with the previous observation, it follows that each q(ω) can be decomposed
in the same fashion as above.
In essence, this is the recursive structure. The sequential game is represented
by a static one. This, in turn, can be decomposed into a current game and a
continuation game, and the continuation game is subject to the same decom-
position. Moreover (see below), an equilibrium profile in the repeated game is
recovered as a sequence of static equilibria, each associated to a static game.
This results suggests (as already noted by APS) a representation of the game
with imperfect public information as a stochastic game. To see this, suppose, to




. Then, the above decomposition permits us
to associate to each ωk , k = 1, 2, 3, 4, a continuation game, CG(ωk, fk), where
payoﬀs are defined by
qi(ω





and range (qk) ⊆ V .









where the diagram means that players are told that they will play the game





ω is realized, they are publicly informed of such a realization, and if, say, ω1
is realized they will play the game CG(ω1, q1) in stage 1, etc.. Moreover, for
each of the continuation games (auxiliary one-shot games, in the terminology of
APS) we can perform the same decomposition, and so on.
This procedure leads us to recover the equilibrium behavioral strategies of
the repeated game as sequences of Nash equilibria of the various continuation
games we construct along the above decomposition.
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3.2 The Problem of the Recursive Structure in Games
with Private Monitoring
The claim of the nonexistence of a recursive structure in repeated games with
imperfect private monitoring relies, essentially, on the inability of deterministi-
cally specifying the continuation play when private information is present. To
see this, let us get back to the public information case and consider what hap-
pens in that setting. Recall that strategies are maps from the signals to the
set of (mixed) actions, and fix an equilibrium profile σ of the repeated game.
In that setting, after the first stage is played some ω is realized and publicly
observed. It follows that beliefs of Bayesian players are concentrated on that ω
and hence on the strategy profile that according to σ follows that ω. In other
words, each player can infer from the realization ω the opponents’ continuation
strategies deterministically. When private information is present, this link is
broken: player i’s continuation strategy depends on the signal he received, and
this signal is unknown to player j. A consequence is that the actual continuation
profile is not common knowledge among the players. This last fact has been
interpreted as a suggestion that a recursive structure is not achievable in the
presence of private information ([5], [12], [19]). The argument goes, essentially,
as follows. The continuation play depends on the signals received by each player
as well as on the conditional probabilities that each player has about the oppo-
nents’ signals, and hence on their continuation strategies. Now suppose that we
propose some profile σ, and we want to check whether or not it is an equilibrium
for the repeated game. To do so, let us consider a deviation of player i from the
proposed profile in the first stage. Then, while each player j 6= i will compute
his conditionals according to the given profile σ, player i will derive his condi-
tionals by taking his own deviation into account. The implication hence derived
is that, at such a point, not only the actual continuation profile is not common
knowledge, but not even the family of conditionals is. This last circumstance,
finally, seems to prevent any attempt to decide whether the continuation strate-
gies conforming to the proposed profile σ may constitute an equilibrium at all,
and hence the ability to check whether the hypothesized deviation is profitable
or not. In other words, in the presence of private information what seems to
be irremediably broken is the link between the incentive structure in the first
period and that of subsequent periods.
A couple of considerations are now probably in order. First, it should be
noted that common knowledge of an equilibrium profile is a necessary condition
“locally”, that is, it is required to hold at an equilibrium (Aumann and Branden-
burger [3]). Second, like any game with private information, a careful analysis
of the problem outlined above would require the consideration of a hierarchy of
beliefs, which is not carried out above.
Before proceeding, it may help to restate the above argument by using the
representation in terms of stochastic games given in the previous subsection.
Suppose that each of two players can get one of two signals L and H. Then,
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The interpretation is, as before, that players play the component game G, and
then they enter the set of games G(Θ) = {CG(θ) | θ ∈ Θ}, with the payoﬀs












say, ω = θ = (L,H) is realized, then player 1 observes L and knows that the
true game is either CG ((L,L)) or CG ((L,H)), while player 2 observes H and
knows that it is either CG ((L,H)) or CG ((H,H)). We can see that the actual
continuation game (the one associated with the actual realization of θ) is not
common knowledge among the players.
The argument above can then be restated by saying that if we suppose
that the decomposition into current and continuation game could actually be
performed, it would lead to a continuation game that is not common knowledge
among the players. This, in turn, would prevent us from checking whether the
proposed profile was indeed an equilibrium.
Note, however, that the figure itself seems to suggest that we might think of
the continuation game in a diﬀerent way. In fact, given a family of conditional
probability distributions {p(θj | θi)}i∈I , the pair
¡{p(θj | θi)}i∈I , G(Θ)¢ defines
a game of incomplete information where player 1 is told the row where the true









This is tantamount to saying that the continuation play is now determined
stochastically. (Note, also, that this description contains the public information
case as a special case).
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In the next section, I will show that these considerations do hold water, and
that this procedure does lead us to recover a recursive structure for games with
private monitoring by considering the appropriate state space for the repeated
game.
3.3 Games of Incomplete Information: a first check of con-
sistency
A game of incomplete information is a triple
½





Θi is the set of types for player i, {pi} is a family of probability distributions
pi(· | θi) over Θ−i, each representing player i’s beliefs over other players’ types
given that is type is θi, and ∀θ ∈ Θ, Γ(θ) is a normal form game. A strategy for
player i is σi : Θi → ∆(Ai). In these games the notion of type accounts for all
the information that a player has about the game, and that it is not common
knowledge among the players.
A game of incomplete information is said to be consistent if there is a prob-
ability distribution P (·) over Θ = ×
i∈I
Θi, such that the pi’s are the conditionals
computed from P (·) by Bayes’ formula. If such a P exists, it can be given the
meaning of a common prior ([17]). Then, from the viewpoint of the NE, the
game is equivalent to an extensive form game where “Nature” moves first se-
lecting a vector of types θ according to P , then each player is informed about
his own type and the game is played (Harsanyi [11]). Mertens and Zamir ([17],
Cor. 4.7) have shown that if such a consistent probability P exists, then it
is common knowledge among the players. Hence ([17], Thm. 5.3), the above
extensive form game is common knowledge as well.
For future reference, fix an equilibrium profile of the two-stage game in the
example above. Such an equilibrium can be determined from the normal-form.
Then, at that equilibrium that profile is common knowledge among the players
([3]), and its first component induces a probability distribution P 1 over the set
of games in stage 1. After stage 0, each player receives his private signal and
computes his conditional from P 1. Hence, the game of incomplete information
played in stage 1 is consistent by construction, and by the preceding it is common
knowledge among the players.
4 The Recursive Structure
Before we address the question of existence of a recursive structure, it might
help the reader if we summarize here the main notational conventions we will
be using in the remaining of the paper. An equilibrium profile in G∞ will be
denoted by σ, and σk will refer to the k-th component of σ (σk is the strategy
profile played in stage k). Occasionally, the same notation will be used to
indicate equilibrium profiles in the auxiliary games, AG(k), introduced below.
No confusion will result. A continuation payoﬀ functions at stage k is typically
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denoted by fk. N stands for the set of natural numbers, which indexes stages
in G∞.
The goal of this section is to show that:
a) For any k ∈ N , any equilibrium payoﬀ vector achievable starting from
stage k in the repeated game G∞ can be achieved as an equilibrium of a static
game Γk. Γk is a game with continuation payoﬀs.
b) Any equilibrium strategy profile that attains such a payoﬀ in Γk is the
stage k-th component of the corresponding equilibrium profile in the repeated
game.
c) For any k ∈ N , Γk and Γk+1 are recursively linked, in the sense that
the expected equilibrium continuation payoﬀs in Γk are the (expectation of the)
equilibrium payoﬀs in Γk+1.
These three properties can be taken as a definition of recursive structure.
They are the multi-player analog of the familiar dynamic programming repre-





satisfying the above properties is called the space of entrance laws.





can be intuitively explained as follows. Consider the requirements a), b) and c),
and, for σ an equilibrium profile in the repeated game, denote by v(σ) |k the
stage k-th expected equilibrium payoﬀ corresponding to σ in G∞. In addition,
denote by vk(·, fk) an equilibrium payoﬀ of a (static) game Γk with continuation
payoﬀs defined by some function fk. Then, for any equilibrium profile σ in G∞,
the requirements a) and b) are equivalent to a set of equations in the unknowns
fk’s like
v(σ) = v0(σ0, f0)
v(σ) |1 = v1(σ1, f1)
.....
v(σ) |k = vk(σk, fk)
.....
(2)
We are concerned with the solutions of the system (2). To this end, we will be
using a method of successive approximations. If we focus on the first equation
only, the method consists in determining its solution, f0, as the uniform limit
of a sequence of functions {fn0 }n∈N . Roughly speaking, the method used here
consists in constructing, for each equilibrium profile σ in G∞, a family of se-
quences {fn0 } , ..., {fnk } , ... (one for each equation) so that the recursive relation
(requirement c)) is satisfied at each step of the construction, fnk −→ fk (uni-
formly) as n −→ ∞ for each k ∈ N , and the fk’s solve (2). Clearly, we must
show that it is so for each equilibrium σ in G∞.
Note, however, that this way of describing the problem is perhaps suggestive
but rather vague. We have said nothing about the domains of the fk’s, and hence
about the form the games Γk’s. In fact, these are themselves unknowns to be
determined.
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Above all, the main diﬃculty to carry out such a program is that, in order
to solve the above equations, we need to specify at which equilibrium profile we
are solving. Since, clearly, to determine the equilibria is part of the problem,
we need a procedure that generates the equilibrium profile in the equations at
the same time it generates the above limits.
Such a procedure is based on the introduction of sequences of finitely re-
peated games, {AG(k)} — whose typical element is called an auxiliary game of
order k. Their definition requires the notion of “state of the repeated game”
and that of “type” of a player. The latter arises immediately in the context we
are interested in, and conforms to that introduced by Harsanyi for games with
incomplete information.
Definition 1 A type θki for player i at k ∈ N is the stream of signals he has
received up to k: θki = {θi,1, ..., θi,k} ∈ Θki .
Definition 2 A state of the world for the game G∞ at stage k ∈ N is an
element θk ∈ Θk = ×
i∈I
Θki .
That is, a state of the world at stage k is an I-tuple of types.
The next definition is that of auxiliary game of order k.
First, given a µ×P k— measurable function fk : Ω×Θk → [0, c]I , associate to















Definition 3 Given a repeated game G∞, an auxiliary game of order k, AGfk−1(k),
is a k-stage game with the following features:
i) In the first k−1 stages the payoﬀs are determined by the stage game G (payoﬀs
in G are multiplied by 1− δ);
ii) At the end of each stage l, l < k − 1, player i receives a private signal
θi,l+1 = θi(ωl+1), l = 0, ..., k − 2;




, and if θ¯
k−1
is the true state of the world, payoﬀs in the
last stage are determined according to CG(θ¯
k−1
).
In each AGfk−1(k), each player has a discount factor δ, and maximizes the
discounted sum of his per-period payoﬀs. Note that when θi,l is only imperfectly
related to ωl, players have only partial information about the true game in the





In the sequel, when referring to an AGfk−1(k), we will occasionally drop
either the subscript or the reference to k. No confusion should result. In the
simple game with two players and two signals described above, an auxiliary
game of order 2 is like the one depicted at the end of section 3.2. With reference













The main motivation for the introduction of the sequences {AG(k)}’s relies
on the following transparent property::
Fact Consider the set of all I-player δ-discounted (finitely or infinitely) repeated
games with bounded payoﬀs whose stage game has the same action spaces




where vi(σ) is player i’s payoﬀ in the repeated game generated by a profile
σ.
It is immediate that every sequence {AG(k)} converges, as k →∞, uniformly
to G∞ in this norm.
The properties stated in the next Lemma and in the Corollary thereafter are
the first step to show that requirements a), b) and c) are satisfied.
Lemma 4 For any game AGfk(k+1) and any equilibrium profile s = (s
0, ..., sk)
of AGfk(k + 1), there exists a game AGfk−1(k) which generates the same equi-
librium payoﬀ vector as s in AGfk(k+1). Moreover, such a payoﬀ is generated
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in AGfk−1(k) by the equilibrium profile which is the restriction of s to the first
k stages.
Proof. Consider an AGfk(k+1), and its associated normal-form. By Nash,
equilibria exist. Let s be an equilibrium profile. To ease notation, set dZt =









































fk | fk : Ω×Θk → [0, c]I
ª
. To prove the Lemma we need only to
show that there exists a function in fˆk−1 ∈ Fk−1 so that the above payoﬀ
can be expressed as a payoﬀ in AGfˆk−1(k). In fact, since — from the normal-
form — the equilibrium condition (player i’s incentive constraint) is satisfied,
such a payoﬀ would necessarily be an equilibrium payoﬀ in AGfˆk−1(k) (this is
immediately checked by applying the transformation below to both sides of the










































First, note that clearly f˜i : Θk → R is P k-summable and range( f˜i) ⊆ [0, c]
(range (gi) ⊆ [0, c], along with fi(·, θk) : Ω → [0, c] and δ < 1, imply range
(f˜i) ⊆ [0, c]). Now, given the f˜i : Θk → [0, c], we show that there exists a










Let π1 : Ω × Θk−1 → Ω be the projection on the first factor, and let π2 :
Ω×Θk−1 → Θk−1 be the projection on the second. Let h : Ω×Θk−1 → Θk be
defined by h = (θ ◦ π1)⊗π2, that is h(ω, θk−1) =
³




It is immediate that h is measurable (being the tensor product of measurable
mappings) and that so is fˆi : Ω×Θk−1 → [0, c] defined by fˆi = f˜i ◦ h. Clearly,
such an fˆi satisfies (3).































































For future reference, it is useful to make here the following observation. Set
F 0k−1 = Fk−1 =
©
fk−1 | fk−1 : Ω×Θk−1 → [0, c]I and fk−1 is µ× P k−1— measurable
ª
,
and notice that the proof of the Lemma defines a correspondence Ik : Fk →
Fk−1. Obviously, Ik(Fk) = F 1k−1 ⊆ F 0k−1. If we start from the set of possible
auxiliary games of order k + 2, we can then apply the procedure twice and ob-
tain the set F 2k−1 = Ik (Ik+1(Fk+1)). In a similar fashion, we can define the sets
Fnk−1, ∀n ∈ N . Then, it follows immediately (by induction) that F
n+1
k−1 ⊆ Fnk−1,
∀n ∈ N .
As an immediate consequence of the lemma, we obtain the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 5 ∀k ∈ N , and any NE profile s of AGfk(k + 1), there exists a se-







i∈I of s is a NE of (Γ
t, P t). In addition, {(Γt, P t)}k−1t=0 is defined
in a recursive way and the equilibrium payoﬀ generated by s is a NE payoﬀ of





Proof. Let (s0, s1, ..., sk−1) be a Nash equilibrium in AGfk(k + 1). Recall






. Since s is a NE, it induces a common prior P k over
this family of games. When players enter the last stage — the one defined by the





, each has a conditional proba-
bility that depends on the signals he has received. At s, all this conditionals









is common knowledge among the players.
Clearly, sk−1 is a NE of such a game (by contradiction, using the fact that s
is a NE for AGfk(k + 1) as established in the normal-form). Now, consider the
problem the players face in AGfk(k + 1) at the beginning of stage k − 1. Each
players has, at that point, a conditional probability about the true state of the
world at k−1, and — for the same reason as before — all these conditionals come
from a common prior P k−1. It is immediate to see that the last two stages in
AGfk(k + 1) along with P
k−1 define a game with incomplete information, and
that (sk−1, sk) is a NE of such a game. Moreover, by using the same argument
as in the preceding Lemma, the equilibrium payoﬀ corresponding to (sk−1, sk)








, and such a payoﬀ is obtained by the























. By considering the problem
players face at stages k − 2, k − 3, etc., and proceding in the same fashion, the
statement follows.
The property expressed by Lemma 4 allows us to determine, at the same
time, both the equilibrium profiles in the repeated game and, for each equilib-
rium, the functions that solve the equations (2).
Recall that Fk =
n
fk | fk : Ω×Θk → [0, c]I
o
. According to definition 3,
any fk ∈ Fk defines an auxiliary game of order k, AGfk(k). Such a game has
a finite normal-form; hence (Nash), we can determine the equilibria of such a
game. Lemma 4 then says that for each equilibrium we can associate to fk a
function fk−1 ∈ Fk−1. By applying the same procedure for all the fk’s in Fk, it
remains defined, as noted above, a correspondence Ik−1 : Fk → Fk−1.
We can now construct the successive approximations. First, consider all the
possible auxiliary games of order 1, and let AGf0(1), f0 ∈ F0, be one of those.
In these games, the choice of the continuation function is restricted only by the




the set of Nash equilibrium profiles
associated to f0 in AGf0(1). Now, consider all the possible AGf1(2), f1 ∈ F1.
Each AGf1(2) has a finite normal form. Its equilibria are pairs (σ
0,σ1)(f1).
By Lemma 4, to each f1 and each (σ0,σ1)(f1) we can associate a function




is an equilibrium of AGf10 (1). By repeating
the procedure for each f1 ∈ F1, we determine a subset of all possible auxil-
iary games of order 1. Such a subset has the property that, for each game,
both the equilibrium profiles and the continuation functions are consistent with
equilibrium behavior in the second stage, when the continuation function are
unrestricted in the second stage. Similarly, starting from all possible games
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of order 3, we first determine a subset of the games of order 2 so that, for
each game in the subset, equilibrium profiles and continuation functions are
consistent with equilibrium behavior in the third stage. Note that now equi-
librium profiles are of the type (σ0,σ1)(·). Then, by applying again Lemma
4, we further restrict the set of auxiliary games of order 1. Continuing in this
way, we generate profiles (σ0,σ1, ...,σm) so that if (σ0,σ1, ...,σm) is an equi-
librium profile of AGfm(m), then (σ
0,σ1, ...,σm−1) is an equilibrium profile of
AGf1m−1(n − 1), f
1
m−1 ∈ Im(fm). At the same time, we have been generating




, ... by means of the relation f1j−1 ∈ Ij(fj).
As n → ∞, a profile (σ0,σ1, ...,σn) tends to a profile σ that is feasible in
the repeated game as it respects, by construction, the signalling structure of
the latter. In light of the convergence property of the {AG(k)}’s (the Fact
above), to show that these limiting profiles are equilibria (and all the equilibria)





each k the limit exists. Even though a direct proof will be given only below
(Theorem 6 — Lemma 7), assume for a moment that it is, indeed, so. That




converge, as n −→ ∞, and that the
profiles σ thus determined are the equilibrium profiles of the repeated game.
Then, if fn−kk −→ f∗k as n −→ ∞, we can define an auxiliary game of order k,
AGf∗k (k), so that each equilibrium payoﬀ vector in AGf∗k (k) is an equilibrium
payoﬀ vector in G∞, and each equilibrium profile in AGf∗k (k) coincides with the
first k components of the corresponding equilibrium in G∞. Moreover, this is
so for any k ∈ N .
At this point, to complete the proof that all the requirements a), b) and c)
are satisfied, we need only to apply Corollary 5. In other words, we have
1. For any k ∈ N , any equilibrium payoﬀ vector achievable starting from
stage k in the repeated game G∞ can be obtained as an equilibrium of a (con-
sistent) static game with incomplete info (Γk, P k). For any k ∈ N , (Γk, P k) is
a game with continuation payoﬀs.
2. An equilibrium profile σk that obtains such a payoﬀ in (Γk, P k) is the
stage kth-component of an equilibrium profile that attains that same equilibrium
payoﬀ in G∞ (starting from stage k).
3. (The recursive relation) For each equilibrium σ in G∞, the equilib-
rium continuation payoﬀs in (Γk, P k)(σ) are the expected equilibrium payoﬀ
in (Γk+1, P k+1)(σ).
The method of successive approximations described above can be summa-
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where (as observed above) for any k and n in N , Fn+1k ⊆ Fnk .
The following theorem establishes the existence of all the limits F∞k .
Theorem 6 For any k ∈ N , and any n ∈ N , each Fnk is nonempty and com-
pact. Hence, for any k ∈ N , F∞k is nonempty.
Proof. First observe that Fk is weak∗—compact for each k ∈ N . By the
upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence, the correspondence
Ik : Fk+1 ⇒ Fk constructed in Lemma 4 is nonempty valued and upperhemi-
countinuous, for each k ∈ N . Hence, the projective limit of the projective
sequence {Fk, Ik} is nonempty.
A brief comment is in order. In the proof above, we showed existence
of the limits by showing that the projective limit of the projective sequence
{Fk, Ik} is nonempty. Recall that such a projective limit is the set of se-
quences (a subset of ×
k
Fk) with the property that if fk is the kth — element
in a sequence, then it belongs to the image according to Ik of the (k + 1)th





Fk | fk ∈ Ik(fk+1)
¾
. The property of the projective limit ex-
presses the inductive relation c) at the beginning of this section. Once an fk
is known, we can define inductively, for each t > k, the continuation payoﬀ
functions by means of the relation fk ∈ Ik(fk+1).
5 The equilibrium payoﬀ set
An immediate consequence of the procedure developed in the previous section
is the following characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀ set as the limit of a
sequence of nested compact sets.
Let V0 = [0, c]
I and F0 = {f = (f1, ..., fI) | f : Ω → [o, c]I , f measurable}.
Also, recall that Fk =
n
f | f : Ω×Θk → [0, c]I , f measurable
o
, and that a
choice of fk ∈ Fk defines (definition 3) an auxiliary game of order k, AGfk(k).
Denote by Vk,f the set of Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors of such an auxiliary









Vn. Then, (i) Vk is nonempty and compact (in RI), ∀k ∈ N ; (ii)





Proof. (i) By Nash, Vk,f 6= ∅. To show that Vk is compact, first note that
V0 is compact, and so is each Fk. Let {vnk }∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in Vk.
To such a sequence, there corresponds a sequence {fnk }∞n=1 of elements in Fk.
Then, it suﬃces to show that for fnk → fk as n −→ ∞, vnk −→ vk ∈ Vk, which
is just the upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence AGfk(k)⇒ Vk,f .





such that σ is a Nash equilibrium of AGf1(2). By Lemma
4 we can define a function fˆ ∈ F0 (that is fˆ : Ω→ [0, c]I) such that









and v2 is a Nash equilibrium of AGfˆ (1). Hence, v2 ∈ V1. By induction (Lemma
4 and the observation thereafter), Vk+1 ⊆ Vk.
(iii) If v ∈ V , then, since the functions in Fn are restricted only by the
feasibility condition, there exists an fn ∈ Fn such that v is a equilibrium payoﬀ
of AGfn(n). Hence, v ∈ Vn. Since it is so for any n ∈ N , v ∈ V∞.
Let v∗ ∈ V∞. Then, there exists a sequence {f∗n}, f∗n ∈ Fn, such that v∗
is an equilibrium of AGf∗n(n), for any n ∈ N . Let σ
∗ be the strategy profile





supports v∗. Suppose, v∗ /∈ V . Then, for some i, there exists a strategy σi in
G∞ for player i such that vi(σi,σ∗−i) = v
∗
i + ε, for some ε > 0. (vi(σi,σ
∗
−i) is
the payoﬀ achieved by player i in G∞ when he plays σi and his opponents play
σ∗−i). In particular, there exists a set K ⊆ N such that σi 6= σ∗i on K. Let k be
the least element in K. Pick n >k. Since vi(σi,σ∗−i) = v
∗
i + ε, there exists an
fn ∈ Fn such that player i achieves vi(σi,σ∗−i) in AGfn(n) when the restriction
to the first n stages of (σi,σ∗−i) is played in AGfn(n). We claim that for any
n ∈ N , ε ≤ δnc. In fact, if ε > δnc, player i can play according to σi for the first
n−1 stages in AGf∗n(n). Since AGfn(n) and AGf∗n(n) diﬀer only because of the
last stage, and in both cases the opponents play according to σ∗−i, by doing so
player i can ensure himself the same payoﬀ in the first n−1 stages in both games.
Hence, the payoﬀ v˜i that he gets in AGf∗n(n) by playing σi against σ
∗
−i is at least
as big as vi(σi,σ∗−i) − δnc. Hence, v˜i ≥ vi(σi,σ∗−i) − δnc = v∗i + ε − δnc > v∗i ,
which contradicts σ∗ being an equilibrium of AGf∗n(n). Since, we can do the
same reasoning for any n >k, ε ≤ δnc for any n >k, which contradicts the
assumption ε > 0.
Three easy implications of this above proof are probably worth to be stressed.
First, while existence of equilibria is not an issue in the present setting
(the infinite repetition of a Nash equilibrium of G is an equilbrium of G∞),
it is worth noticing that the proof is itself an existence proof. To this end,
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it suﬃces to observe that the family {Vk} has the finite intersection property.
The observation might reveal useful when the model is enlarged to allow for a
stochastic game aspect (i.e., the component game G is allowed to vary with the
state).
Second, the proof oﬀers a way to approximate the equilibrium payoﬀs of
G∞, a fact that might come useful when dealing with eﬃciency issues. Let fn
be any given function such that fn : Ω×Θn → [0, c]I . According to definition 3,
such a choice defines an auxiliary game of order n, AGfn(n). Let Vn(fn) be the
equilibrium payoﬀs set of this AGfn(n), and let vn,fn be an element in this set.
For any choice of fn and any n, the auxiliary game admits a finite normal form.
Hence, up to some n, Vn(fn) can be computed. Then, it follows from above that
the approximation in computing an equilibrium payoﬀ vector of the repeated
game with an element of Vn(fn) is less than δ
nc, where δ is the discount factor
and c bounds the payoﬀ function. Furthermore, this bound does not depend on
the particular choice of fn. In other words,
Vn ⊂
©
x ∈ RI | d(x, V ) < δncª
where d(x, V ) = inf
v∈V
kx− vk, k·k denotes the Euclidean norm, and, as before V
is the equilibrium payoﬀ set of G∞.
Finally, one can express F∞, the projective limit of the previous section, as
the largest invariant set of an operator on ×
k
Fk. This observation provides some
ground, at least in principle, for a computational approach to the entrance laws
and to the equilibrium payoﬀ set (which is the image of F∞0 under the Nash
equilibrium correspondence). Formally, we have




Fk such that the largest
invariant set of T is F∞.
Proof. For each k, we have correspondences Ik : Fk+1 ⇒ Fk (I0 : F0 −→
[0, c]I). For each x ∈ ×
k
Fk, let gx be the graph of the correspondence Ik (x(k)),






. Then, the correspondence
that associates x with such a graph is a correspondence from ×
k





. It is the canonical extension of the family {Ik}. By composing such

















Fk. It follows from theorem 6 that T has an
invariant set, and that its largest invariant set is F∞.
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6 Extensions
6.1 Compact signal spaces
If we allow for infinite signal spaces, Θi, neither existence of equilibria of the
AGfn(n)’s (for each fn ∈ Fn) nor the upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium
correspondence are guaranteed any longer. Hence, in order to preserve the va-
lidity of our reasonings, we have to strenghten our assumptions. One possibility
is to replace assumption (vi) with the following set.
(vi.1) Each Θi is a complete, separable metric space;
(vi.2) The signalling function θi : Ω→ Θi is continuous;
(vi.3) For each k ∈ N , P k is absolutely continuous with respect to the
product of its marginals.
In such a cse, the same argument as in Theorems 1 and 2 in Milgrom and
Weber ([18]), ensure existence of equilibria of the AGfn(n)’s (for each fn ∈ Fn)
as well as the upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence.
6.2 More general games
Modulo technical assumptions, our procedure can be extended to account for
a large variety of features like deterministic state-transitions, stochastic state-
transitions, stochastic signalling functions, etc..In fact, even in these circum-
stances, we can immediately give the same definitions of a type and a state
of the world we gave above as soon as we appropriately enlarge those spaces.
We, then, obtain the same construction and invoke Mertens-Zamir’s theorem to
establish the existence of a consistent probability on the set of possible states of
the world at n, for any n ∈ N . The Mertens-Zamir consistent probability along
with a specification of continuation payoﬀs will define a continuation game of
incomplete information. We can then introduce the concept of auxiliary game of
order n, appropriately modified to allow for the physical environment to change
(either stochastically, or deterministically) from one stage to another. The suc-
cessive approximations will then lead, as in section 4, to the space of consistent
entrance laws, and to the determination of the equilibrium payoﬀs set of the
repeated game.
7 Conclusions
In the Introduction, we said that one of the main motivations for the present
work was the claim, present in most of the literature, of nonexistence of a
recursive structure in games with private monitoring. As pointed out in that
literature, this would have implied the inability of using dynamic programming
methods and, hence, of describing a player’s problem in any arbitrary stage and
contingency. Consequently, the construction of a comprehensive theory for this
class of games appeared out of reach. It goes without saying that a statement
with such consequences called for a direct answer.
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In this paper, we showed the existence of a recursive structure. In our repre-
sentation, the strategic problem each player faces in any stage and contingency
is described by means of a (static) game of incomplete information. By the





sents all the information that is needed to analyze the repeated game starting









in an inductive way.
In the paper, we also provided (by means of the successive approximations) a
constructive approach to the determination of these games, and hence to the
representation itself.
Our construction emerges in a very natural way. With our definitions, the
space of types is just the space of signals for the various players, and a state of
the world is just a collection of types. These definitions came naturally from the
definition of a player’s strategy (a mapping from his information to his mixed
action), and, in fact, our state space is the minimal one that ensures that all
the games in the class we considered have perfect recall.
One first implication of our finding is the characterization of the equilibrium
payoﬀ set given above. More broadly, we feel that the main contribution of
this paper is to have clarified the core concepts at the basis of a theory, and
in which context the various questions are to be addressed. For instance, our
setting delivers an immediate answer to the question of the common knowledge
of the continuation play, which was very obscure before.
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